Members were able to cast their votes on issues from membership fees to the change in our Board of Directors and voiced their strong support for WEC Türkiye to strengthen our network and increase our regional and global activities.

The Assembly came to end with WEC Türkiye Chair and Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of The Republic of Türkiye, His Excellency Dr. Alparslan Bayraktar’s closing statement in which Dr. Bayraktar reinforced WEC Türkiye’s pivotal role in connecting civil societies and public sectors in Türkiye.

Dr. Bayraktar emphasized WEC Türkiye’s role in forging Türkiye’s carbon neutrality goal by providing a fair and open platform for dialogue and cooperation. During His closing statement, Dr. Bayraktar highlighted the importance of creating and fostering dialogue and collaboration on critical minerals and rare earth elements on a regional and global level.

As a Member Committee of World Energy Council, we will continue in our mission to inform and connect different segments of society enabling smarter, fairer, and more far-reaching energy transition.

Board of Directors

1. ALPARSLAN BAYRAKTAR
2. ENERJİ PİYASASI DÜZENLEME KURUMU
3. ENERJİSA ENERJİ A.Ş.
4. ENERJİ PİYASALARI İŞLETME A.Ş.
5. SOCAR TÜRKİYE ENERJİ A.Ş.
6. TÜRKİYE PETROLLERİ A.O.
7. ETİ MADEN İŞLETMELERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
8. MEHMET ERTÜRK
9. RÖNESANS ENERJİ ÜRETİM VE TİCARET A.Ş.
10. KİBAR ENERJİ A.Ş.
11. TÜRKİYE ELEKTRİK İLETİM A.Ş.
12. BORU HATLARI İLE PETROL TAŞIMA A.Ş.

Supervisory Board:

1. ELTEMTEK ELEKTRİK TESİSLERİ MÜHENDİSLİK MÜTEAHHİTLİK DANIŞMANLIK VE TİCARET A.Ş.
2. İLKER ILGIN
3. BOTAŞ INTERNATIONAL A.Ş. (BIL)

Key findings in the report are as follows:

• ‘‘Critical Materials’’ refers to minerals and metals generally viewed as highly important as inputs for a renewables-based energy transition, including but not limited to Cobalt, Copper, Graphite, Iridium, Lithium, Manganese, Nickel, Platinum, and selected rare earth elements.

• Selected Critical Materials Energy Related Technology Applications

• The Energy Transition will be a main driver of demand for several critical materials. IREA’s 1.5 °C scenario includes 33,000 GW of Renewable power and electrification of 90% of Road transport in 2050.

• Assessment of the criticality of materials is dynamic and continuously changing owing to Economic, Geopolitical, and Technological factors. Presently, there is no universally accepted definition of critical materials.

• Critical Material supply disruptions have minimal impact on Energy Security, but outsized impacts on the Energy Transition. For, already built renewable infrastructure could operate for decades. On the other hand, New renewable infrastructures could not be built if there is a supply disruption in critical materials which ultimately undermines the energy transition.

• Dependency risks and supply dynamics of critical materials fundamentally differ from those of fossil fuels. Despite there is no scarcity of reserves for Energy Transition materials, capabilities for mining and refining them are very limited now due to under-investment in upstream activities.

• The Mining and processing landscape of critical materials is geographically concentrated, with a select group of countries playing dominant role. For instance, 100% of natural graphite, dysprosium supply comes from China. 70% of Cobalt comes from Congo, 47% of Lithium comes from Australia.

• 15 billion tons of fossil fuels were extracted in 2021 alone. Oil and Gas exports represented a value of USD 2 trillion in 2021. On the other hand, only 10 million tons of critical materials were produced for low-carbon technologies in 2022.

• Export restrictions on raw materials are a growing concern in international trade. Incidences of such restrictions have grown more than fivefold over the past decade (Figure 2.11) (OECD, 2023). Export restrictions usually take multiple forms, including export quotas, export taxes, obligatory minimum export prices, or licensing

• A growing number of countries and corporations are showing interest in deep-sea mining for critical materials, that is, extracting mineral resources from the ocean floor. To date, 22 state and private contractors hold 31 mining exploration contracts to search for polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts which are extremely rich in valuable metals with high-grade ore, such as cobalt, copper and manganese.

• Critical material mining projects can exacerbate water stress. About half of the global copper and lithium production, for example, is concentrated in high-water-stress areas (Gielen et al., 2022b; IRENA, forthcoming). This includes the “lithium triangle”, a lithium-rich (65% of the world’s lithium reserves) region in Andes encompassed by the borders of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile.

• Many battery minerals are mined in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the actual value-addition work, such as smelting, refining, cell assembly and ultimately EV production often takes place elsewhere. As Figure 3.8 illustrates, the mining of nickel, lithium and cobalt has only a 0.6% share in the total EV value chain (1.1% if metal smelting and refining are included).

• The concentration of critical material mining and processing in a handful of countries has raised concerns about the reliability of global supply chains, prompting governments and stakeholders to develop strategies to mitigate their vulnerability. These strategies aim to secure access to critical minerals and materials, promote domestic production, and reduce dependence on any single supplier or region.

Policy Considerations and The Way Forward

• Comprehensive, economy-wide evaluations of critical material demand are essential to identify potential risks and help avoid competition between sectors. Countries should carefully assess the effects of surging demand for critical materials across all economic sectors, in line with their net-zero strategies. Currently, most demand for these materials comes from sectors unrelated to the energy transition, including electronics, aviation, defense, healthcare, and steel and aluminum production.

• No country alone can fulfil its demand for all critical materials, so collaborative strategies that benefit all involved need to be developed and implemented. Given the extensive lead times for establishing new mines and processing plants, concentrated supply chains are expected to persist in the near future. Countries should aim to develop dual strategies to ensure co-operation to keep markets functioning while also working to diversify supply chains in the long term.

• Comprehensive assessments of critical materials should be conducted for each mineral to fully grasp the dependencies, risks and innovations that may affect supply and demand. Despite the long list of identified critical materials, not all are equally important for the energy transition, nor are their criticality assessments consistent. For instance, innovation has resulted in an increased use of substitute materials for those considered critical, such as neodymium, copper, and lithium.

• Geopolitical risks can be mitigated through enhanced investment in research and development, which would expedite the creation of alternative solutions, boost efficiency, and expand recycling and repurposing options. Several strategies can be employed to prevent major supply challenges leading up to 2050, with a focus on this decade. Key among these are product design strategies to minimize the use of critical materials, and the recycling and reuse of products to reclaim scarce materials.

• Greater data transparency and oversight of certain critical materials are required to mitigate uncertainty in supply and demand projections. The starting point should be the collection of more detailed information and data on reserves, production, investment, and pricing, among other factors, to track current supply and increase market transparency. The adoption of international quality standards and certification for key products involving critical materials could also facilitate market formation.

• International co-operation is crucial in creating transparent markets with coherent standards and norms, grounded in human rights, environmental stewardship and community engagement. The energy-driven mineral boom offers a chance to rewrite the legacy of the extractive industry. Known issues surrounding mining practices need a proactive response from both nations and corporations. Importer and exporter countries must collaborate to develop supply chains that uphold clear standards regarding human rights, environmental concerns and community engagement. These standards are essential to human security and their absence is one of the root causes of geopolitical instability. In this regard, mining corporations should be held accountable for the responsible management of extraction processes.

Full Report: “Geopolitics Of The Energy Transition-Critical Materials”, International Renewable Energy Agency

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As part of our ‘‘WEC Mondays-Guest Speaker Series’’ we hosted Sylvia Beyer, Senior Energy Analyst, G7/G20 Coordinator (IEA).

In Sylvia’s presentation on ‘‘Overcoming the Energy Trilemma’’, Sylvia highlighted:

• Global energy-related CO₂ emissions have reached record levels. Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and industry totaled 37.4 billion metric tons in 2023 which is more than a 60% increase compared to 1990 level. Due to unprecedented droughts during 2022-2023 season which drastically decreased global hydroelectricity generation, countries such as China and India were forced to reopen some of their already decommissioned coal power plants for electricity generation. However, advanced economies such as the US, Japan and the EU have seen remarkable CO2 reductions in recent years.

• Global carbon dioxide emissions and total energy demand has started to decouple primarily due to record level increase in clean energy supply. While total global emissions have reached a record high in 2023, annual change from 2022 to 2023 had decreased. In other words, the rate of year-on-year CO2 emissions growth is slowing down.

• In advanced economies, the decoupling of CO2 emissions and economic growth is remarkable. Emissions have fallen back to levels of 50 years ago in G7 countries where GDP has grown more than 3 times.

• Clean energy investment is widening the gap over fossil fuels. Since 2016, clean energy investment has overtaken fossil fuel investment. As of today, for every dollar invested in fossil fuels, about 1.7 dollars are going into clean energy investment, the same ratio was one-to-one five years ago.

• The growth in clean energy investment has been strong, but sadly uneven. There are certainly bright spots in other countries when it comes to clean energy investment, however, more than 90% of the increase in clean energy investment since 2021 has taken place in advanced economies and China. When it comes to clean energy investment, emerging markets and developing economies have 2-3 times higher capital cost than advanced economies due to geopolitical and market uncertainties, less transparency, and lack of strong regulatory framework.

• Unlocking Africa’s energy potential requires more investment. While 20% of the global population lives in Africa, Africa only receives 2% of global clean energy investment. Today, there are 600 million Africans without access to electricity, almost all in sub-Saharan Africa. To reach universal access to electricity by 2030 90 million people would need to gain access each year on average from 2022. Achieving full access to modern energy in Africa by 2030 would require investment of USD 25 billion per year.

• Clean energy technologies will accelerate the needs for critical minerals/metals. Critical minerals availability will pace the transition and requirements for 1.5 DC aligned clean energy technology development. Diversification of supply and security of supply for critical minerals will drive the energy transition. As a result, countries should prioritize policies regarding recycling and reuse of critical minerals in order to build resilience in this highly concentrated supply/refinery chain.

• The historic agreement was signed at COP28. Energy transition is no longer a national agenda anymore. At COP 28, global policy makers agreed to triple renewable capacity and double energy efficiency by 2030. Secondly, for the first time in history, there is a global consensus on Net-Zero Energy System which will be achieved by employing strictly low-carbon energy sources and electrification.

• Tripling of RE capacity by 2030 is within reach but more effort is needed. Massive renewables capacity growth is led by steadily cheaper solar PV, while wind and hydropower’s accelerated expansion is challenged by permitting, financing and social acceptance issues.

• Whether it is Tripling of RE capacity by 2030 or doubling the energy efficiency, Challenges remain for governments to achieve it consistently for the rest of the decade. Although the COP28 target is a global one, each country should take strong and immediate measures to build their own pathways to the global target given their different national, economic, and geographical contexts.

As part of our ‘‘WEC Mondays-Guest Speaker Series’’ we hosted Dr. Paul Dorfman, Chair of Nuclear Consulting Group.

In Dr. Dorfman’s presentation on ‘‘Climate and Power: Nuclear and/or Renewables-Plus’’, Dr. Dorfman highlighted:

• Climate crisis and its impacts have become part of our reality. Compared to previous decades, extreme weather events became more frequent and more devastating in the last decade. In 2023, sea ice in the Antarctic reached an annual maximum extent of 96 million square kilometers(6.55 million square miles), setting a record low maximum in the satellite record that began in 1979. As a result, the rate of precipitation and seasonality had to adjust to new norms all over the world.

• Ocean temperature has hit the highest on record. Extra half a degree difference between 1.5 °C – 2 °C increases the risk of tipping point. On 3^rd February 2024, daily average sea surface temperature set a record high of 21.05 °C, where the previous record was 21.02 °C on 23 August 2023. The difference between where the average sea surface temperature should be and where it is now is quite concerning, not to mention the upward trajectory of average sea surface temperature which is simply alarming.

• To tackle the climate crisis, a historic agreement was signed at COP 28 to triple nuclear capacity to 1.2 TW by 2050 and triple renewable capacity to 11.5 TW by 2030. While the renewable capacity goal is ambitious and certainly brought into the limelight during COP 28, same can not be said for the nuclear capacity goal. In order to explain why nuclear capacity goal is at the backseat of global effort to cope with climate change, we need to investigate the affordability and reliability of nuclear energy given the fact that time is running out.

• The UK has set an ambitious goal to add 24GW of nuclear capacity by 2050, this was enabled by passing of the ‘‘Nuclear Energy Finance Act’’ which reinforced the liberalization of planning, environmental, local democratic accountability rules and norms when it comes to nuclear energy. However, the cost to profit ratio may undermine The UK’s nuclear capacity goal. For instance, the estimated cost for Hinkley Point C Nuclear Power Plant was estimated at £ 18.2 bn in 2016, the updated estimate in 2024 was £31-£35 bn.

• The massive upfront cost of nuclear power plants is one of the many reasons why nuclear energy is falling behind the renewables. The other reason is the Levelized Cost Of Energy (LCOE) for the renewables and other low carbon energy sources. It shouldn’t be surprising to see that LCOE for renewables such as solar and wind are 3-4 times lower than that of nuclear, moreover, even renewables + storage have much lower LCOE than nuclear which explains why renewables are going to do the heavy lifting during the energy transition and not nuclear.

• China is a great example of increasing renewables and nuclear capacity at the same time. However, it must be noted that China has added more wind and solar capacity during the first 9 months of last year (215TWh) than all its nuclear reactors under construction will provide(206TWh).

• Due to lower cost and higher efficiency, IPCC has stated that the renewables are 10 times more efficient than nuclear at CO2 mitigation to 2030. For the reasons that we’ve mentioned above, renewables are attracting most of the investment and finance while, nuclear investment had been on a flat trajectory in the last several decades.

• While the nuclear energy sector was facing challenges such as low investment, huge upfront cost, construction delays and safety issues, the impacts of climate change have exacerbated these existing conditions. Extreme weather events jeopardize the physical safety of nuclear power plants, which can have dire consequences if an accident were to occur.

• Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are thought to be the solution for traditional nuclear energy’s cost and long build times and other problems, however, SMRs are up to a decade behind large reactors in terms of their commercial development.

• Time is running out. Consequently, we should focus on the expansion of renewable energy in all sectors, raid growth and modernization of the electricity grid and management, energy conservation and efficiency in our efforts to mitigate climate change.

Renewables 2023

 Analysis and forecasts to 2028

Key Findings:

• Global annual renewable capacity additions increased by almost 50% to nearly 510 gigawatts (GW) in 2023, the fastest growth rate in the past two decades.

This is the 22nd year in a row that renewable capacity additions set a new record. While the increases in renewable capacity in Europe, the United States and Brazil hit all-time highs, China’s acceleration was extraordinary. In 2023, China commissioned as much solar PV as the entire world did in 2022, while its wind additions also grew by 66% year-on-year. Globally, solar PV alone accounted for three-quarters of renewable capacity additions worldwide.

• Achieving the COP28 target of tripling global renewable capacity by 2030 hinges on policy implementation or lack thereof.

These 4 main challenges must be addressed on the policy level in order to achieve the COP28 target and they are: 1) policy uncertainties and delayed policy responses to the new macroeconomic environment; 2) insufficient investment in grid infrastructure preventing faster expansion of renewables; 3) cumbersome administrative barriers and permitting procedures and social acceptance issues; 4) insufficient financing in emerging and developing economies.

• G20 countries account for almost 90% of global renewable power capacity today.

In the accelerated case, which assumes enhanced implementation of existing policies and targets, the G20 could triple their collective installed capacity by 2030. As such, they have the potential to contribute significantly to tripling renewables globally. However, to achieve the global goal, the rate of new installations needs to accelerate in other countries, too, including many emerging and developing economies outside the G20, some of which do not have renewable targets and/or supportive policies today.

• The global power mix will be transformed by 2028.

The world is on course to add more renewable capacity in the next five years than has been installed since the first commercial renewable energy power plant was built more than 100 years ago. In the main case forecast in this report, almost 3 700 GW of new renewable capacity comes online over the 2023-2028 period, driven by supportive policies in more than 130 countries. Solar PV and wind will account for 95% of global renewable expansion, benefiting from lower generation costs than both fossil and non-fossil fuel alternatives.

• Over the coming five years, several renewable energy milestones are expected to be achieved:

• In 2024, wind and solar PV together generate more electricity than hydropower.

• In 2025, renewables surpass coal to become the largest source of electricity generation.

• Wind and solar PV each surpass nuclear electricity generation in 2025 and 2026 respectively.

• In 2028, renewable energy sources account for over 42% of global electricity generation, with the share of wind and solar PV doubling to 25%.

• China is the world’s renewables powerhouse.

China accounts for almost 60% of new renewable capacity expected to become operational globally by 2028. Despite the phasing out of national subsidies in 2020 and 2021, deployment of onshore wind and solar PV in China is accelerating, driven by the technologies’ economic attractiveness as well as supportive policy environments providing long-term contracts. Our forecast shows that China is expected to reach its national 2030 target for wind and solar PV installations this year, six years ahead of schedule.

China’s role is critical in reaching the global goal of tripling renewables because the country is expected to install more than half of the new capacity required globally by 2030. At the end of the forecast period, almost half of China’s electricity generation will come from renewable energy sources.

• The US, the EU, India and Brazil remain bright spots for onshore wind and solar PV growth.

Solar PV and onshore wind additions through 2028 is expected to more than double in the United States, the European Union, India and Brazil compared with the last five years. Supportive policy environments and the improving economic attractiveness of solar PV and onshore wind are the primary drivers behind this acceleration. In the European Union and Brazil, growth in rooftop solar PV is expected to outpace large-scale plants as residential and commercial consumers seek to reduce their electricity bills amid higher prices.

• Solar PV prices plummet amid growing supply gluts.

In 2023, spot prices for solar PV modules declined by almost 50% year-on-year, with manufacturing capacity reaching three times 2021 levels. The current manufacturing capacity under construction indicates that the global supply of solar PV will reach 1 100 GW at the end of 2024, with potential output expected to be three times the current forecast for demand. Despite unprecedented PV manufacturing expansion in the United States and India driven by policy support, China is expected to maintain its 80-95% share of global supply chains (depending on the manufacturing segment).

• Onshore wind and solar PV are cheaper than both new and existing fossil fuel plants.

In 2023, an estimated 96% of newly installed, utility-scale solar PV and onshore wind capacity had lower generation costs than new coal and natural gas plants. In addition, three-quarters of new wind and solar PV plants offered cheaper power than existing fossil fuel facilities. Wind and solar PV systems will become more cost-competitive during the forecast period.

• The new macroeconomic environment presents further challenges that policy makers need to address.

In 2023, new renewable energy capacity financed in advanced economies was exposed to higher base interest rates than in China and the global average for the first time. Since 2022, central bank base interest rates have increased from below 1% to almost 5%. In emerging and developing economies, renewables developers have been exposed to higher interest rates since 2021, resulting in higher costs hampering faster expansion of renewables.

• The renewable energy industry, particularly wind, is grappling with macroeconomic challenges affecting its financial health – despite a history of financial resilience.

The wind industry has experienced a significant decline in market value as European and North American wind turbine manufacturers have seen negative net margins for seven consecutive quarters due to volatile demand, limited raw material access, economic challenges, and rising interest rates.

• The forecast for wind capacity additions is less optimistic outside China, especially for offshore.

Offshore wind has been hit hardest by the new macroeconomic environment, with its expansion through 2028 revised down by 15% outside China. The challenges facing the industry particularly affect offshore wind, with investment costs today more than 20% higher than only a few years ago. In 2023, developers have cancelled or postponed 15 GW of offshore wind projects in the United States and the United Kingdom. For some developers, pricing for previously awarded capacity does not reflect the increased costs facing project development today, which reduces project bankability.

• Faster deployment of variable renewables increases integration and infrastructure challenges.

The share of solar PV and wind in global electricity generation is forecast to double to 25% in 2028 in our main case. This rapid expansion in the next five years will have implications for power systems worldwide. In the European Union, annual variable renewables penetration in 2028 is expected to reach more than 50% in seven countries, with Denmark having around 90% of wind and solar PV in its electricity system by that time. Although EU interconnections help integrate solar PV and wind generation, grid bottlenecks will pose significant challenges and lead to increased curtailment in many countries as grid expansion cannot keep pace with accelerated installation of variable renewables.

• Current hydrogen plans and implementation don’t match.

Renewable power capacity dedicated to hydrogen-based fuel production is forecast to grow by 45 GW between 2023 and 2028, representing only an estimated 7% of announced project capacity for the period. China, Saudi Arabia and the United States account for more than 75% of renewable capacity for hydrogen production by 2028. Despite announcements of new projects and pipelines, the progress in planned projects has been slow.

• Biofuel deployment is accelerating and diversifying more into renewable diesel and biojet.

Fuel Emerging economies, led by Brazil, dominate global biofuel expansion, which is set to grow 30% faster than over the last five years. Supported by robust biofuel policies, increasing transport fuel demand and abundant feedstock potential, emerging economies are forecast to drive 70% of global biofuel demand growth over the forecast period.

• Electric vehicles (EVs) and biofuels are proving to be a powerful complementary combination for reducing oil demand.

Globally, biofuels and renewable electricity used in EVs are forecast to offset 4 million barrels of oil-equivalent per day by 2028, which is more than 7% of forecast oil demand for transport. Biofuels remain the dominant pathway for avoiding oil demand in the diesel and jet fuel segments. EVs outpace biofuels in the gasoline segment, especially in the United States, Europe and China.

• Renewable heat accelerates amid high energy prices and policy momentum – but not enough to curb emissions.

Modern renewable heat consumption expands by 40% globally during the outlook period, rising from 13% to 17% of total heat consumption. These developments come predominantly from the growing reliance on electricity for process heat – notably with the adoption of heat pumps in non-energy-intensive industries – and the deployment of electric heat pumps and boilers in buildings, increasingly powered by renewable electricity.

China, the European Union and the United States lead these trends, owing to supportive policy environments; updated targets in the European Union and China; strong financial incentives in many markets; the adoption of renewable heat obligations; and fossil fuel bans in the buildings sector.

• However, the trends to 2028 are still largely insufficient to tackle the use of fossil fuels for heat and put the world on track to meet Paris Agreement goals.

Without stronger policy action, the global heat sector alone between 2023 and 2028 could consume more than one-fifth of the remaining carbon budget for a pathway aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Global renewable heat consumption would have to rise 2.2 times as quickly and be combined with widescale demand-side measures and much larger energy and material efficiency improvements to align with the NZE Scenario.

Full Report: Renewables 2023 – Analysis – IEA

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As part of our ‘‘WEC Mondays-Guest Speaker Series’’ we hosted Jim Skea, Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

In Professor Skea’s presentation on ‘‘Key energy findings from the IPCC Sixth Assessment Cycle and plans for the Seventh Assessment Cycle’’, Professor Skea highlighted:

• The potential impacts of climate change necessitated the need for ambitious climate goals worldwide. If we carry on with current policy, we are headed towards global warming of about 3°C by the end of this century. In contrast, if we were to honor ‘‘The Paris Agreement’’, global warming should be kept within the range of 1.5°C -2°C.

• Future climate change is projected to increase the severity of impacts and will increase regional differences. The direct result of global warming had not only exacerbated the loss of biodiversity and the risk of species losses, but maize and fishery yields regressed drastically as well.

• The risks of climate change differ by system. While the coastal ecosystems seem to have a higher threshold for temperature rise compared to land-based ecosystems, the impacts are devastating in both cases, nonetheless. For instance, the average global temperature of 1°C -1.5°C signals an increase in the length of fire season, we observe 70-90% of warm water coral reefs decline under the same global average temperature.

• Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions resulting from human activities unequivocally caused global warming and continue to do so. Between 1990-2020, we observed 1-2% increase in greenhouse gas emissions per year over the last 3 decades, except for 2020. Greenhouse gas emissions reached record high in 2023. However, the emissions from the developed economies in North America and in Europe have started to decline in recent years, which didn’t radically affect the total global emissions, since Eastern Asia had been emitting more greenhouse gases.

• CO2 is long-lived. There is a quasi-linear relationship between cumulative CO2 emissions and global warming. With historical emissions have already been put in the atmosphere since the industrial era, the remaining carbon budgets to limit the global warming to 1.5°C could soon be exhausted, while those for 2°C had already been largely depleted.

• Emissions are distributed unevenly, both in the present day and cumulatively since 1850. While North America and Europe are responsible for 40% of historic emissions, whereas Africa and Southern Asia combined account for just over 10%. Moreover, net anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions per capita today also reflect a similar picture where North America and Europe’s greenhouse gas emissions per capita are 4-5 times higher than that of Africa and Southern Asia.

• The transition towards net zero will have a different pace across different sectors. The first sector which is expected to reach net zero will be in land use/land use change due to forestation and avoided deforestation. The second sector to achieve net zero will be energy supply mainly due to electrification. The transport, industry and buildings will probably be the last sectors to achieve net zero, since transforming the existing infrastructure is costly and challenging. Moreover, Direct air capture and carbon storage and utilization is mainly limited to CO2 at the present time, and technology related to capture other greenhouse gas emissions is still at its infancy.

• The range of demand-side GHG emission reduction potential by 2050 is 40-70% in end-use sectors. However, this can only be achieved if the end-users have the right infrastructure and technology available for them to make greener and more energy efficient choices.

• Carbon Dioxide removal can counterbalance hard-to-eliminate emissions. Given the emphasis on net zero, current removal method is largely limited to improved forest management and afforestation. However, there are other biological and geochemical ways of removing CO2 from the air that are not practiced at a large scale.

• Higher mitigation investment flows are required for all sectors and regions to limit global warming. Current investment flows need a 6-fold increase among all sectors in order to limit global warming to 2°C or below. Specifically, the highest investment gap exists in the transport and agriculture sectors where the current funding needs to increase by at least 7 and 10 times respectively in order to limit global warming to 2°C.

As part of our ‘‘WEC Mondays-Guest Speaker Series’’ we hosted Dr. Roberta Boscolo, Climate and Energy leader at World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

In Dr. Boscolo’s presentation on ‘‘Climate change and its implications on the energy sector’’, Dr. Boscolo highlighted:

• The year 2023 was the hottest year on record. In 2023, global average temperature was above 1°C in all 365 days, only 2 days where the global average temperature was above 2 °C, global average temperature was above 1.5 °C almost 50% of days in 2023. In comparison, global average temperature went above 1.5 °C for only 20% of days in 2016.

• Global temperature change is caused by natural and man-made factors. However, the share of human activities seems to be the major cause of global warming. While, solar cycle and volcanic eruptions and other natural factors are cyclical and subject to natural variabilities, the greenhouse gas emissions have been rising at an alarmingly constant pace since the industrial revolution.

• While the impact of climate change is global, greenhouse gas emissions on the other hand are not evenly distributed. 10% of the population are responsible for more than 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions, the ones who suffer the most are the vulnerable segment of the population with far less carbon footprint.

• Ocean heat content and sea level rise both reached record highs in 2023. Since, ocean absorbs almost 90% of total excessive heat, the rate of sea level rise in the current decade is more than double from the first decade of the satellite record.

• Subsequently, we observed extreme melt season for glaciers in Western North America and European Alps. For instance, in the summer of 2022, we saw 6% mass loss in ice volume in Switzerland, as of today over 10% of ice volumes of the glaciers are lost in Switzerland in the last two years alone. Western North America also recorded the highest glacier mass loss in 2023.

• Water is at the frontline of climate change. Climate change is exacerbating both the water scarcity and water related hazards by disrupting precipitation patterns and the entire water cycle. Consequently, we are experiencing more extreme wildfires, droughts, and floods globally. 3.6 billion people are facing inadequate access to water at least one month a year, it is projected to increase to 5 billion by 2050.

• The frequency and intensity of global disasters are on the rise due to global warming. Climate change will continue to exacerbate the already existing socio-economic problems that we face today, such as poverty, inequalities, population displacement, food security.

• Future emissions will determine the level of changes. Compared to 1850-1900, global surface temperature averaged over 2081-2100 is very likely to be higher by 1.0 °C to 1.8 °C under the very low GHG emission scenario. As a result, we should expect more extreme climate events and be prepared for them.

• The energy sector is not immune to the impacts of climate change. Specifically, extreme weather puts energy infrastructures in grave hazards. Moreover, output from low-carbon energy sources such as hydro, thermal, and nuclear power will suffer the most from the impacts of climate change due to their dependence on water.

• The energy sector is going through a dramatic transformation. In 2022, renewable capacity grew by almost 10%, representing more than 80% of the total net capacity expansion. As a result, many countries are able to decouple their economic growth with greenhouse gas emissions. In COP28, a historic agreement was signed to triple renewable energy capacity and double energy efficiency by 2030.

• The atmosphere has no boundaries. The impacts of climate change are signaling for international cooperation in political, technological, and socio-economic landscape.